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University of Michigan 
Occasions such as this are times when one reflects on the past and
ponders the future. It was only twenty years ago that the now classic
monograph by Campbell and Stanley (1963) was first published. It was
only fifteen years ago that the RFP to evaluate Head Start was issued. It
was only ten years ago that the first government-sponsored training
program in evaluation research admitted its first students. And, of
course, both of the organizations meeting here have been in existence a
shorter time than that. The question we have gathered together to
address is whether a field with such a short history has a long future
before it. And, if so, what does it look like?
TIME
Evaluation has always been concerned with time or-perhaps more
aceurately-timeliness. The logic has been that if evaluation reports are
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not available at the proper time, they will not be utilized and the whole
exercise will be for naught. The consequence of failing the timeliness test
is a distraught, anxiety-ridden, neurotic evaluator. Or worse yet, a
distraught, anxiety-ridden, neurotic and unemployed evaluator. Of
course, those of you who have had government evaluation contracts
know that even meeting deadlines often results in distraught, anxiety-
ridden, neurotic evaluators.
If there is one commandment that guides evaluation it is this: &dquo;Thou
shalt have thy final report in on time.&dquo; Cronbach (1977), in his remarks
to the inaugural meeting of the Evaluation Research Society in 1976,
said: &dquo;Data are no good if the report on them is ready too late.&dquo; He went
on to say a lot of other things with which I also disagree, but timeliness
borne of utility formed the central rationale for his comments. Others
such as Weiss (1977) and, most recent, Chelimsky (198I}, in an address
to this same forum, have echoed the need for timely evaluation results to
ensure proper utilization. I would like to offer a dissenting opinion. I
believe evaluation has for too long been crucified on a cross of
timeliness.
One has only to look back at the Head Start evaluation to see the
problems generated by a so-called timely evaluation. Datta (1976) has
provided an excellent history of that evaluation and its impact. The
Westinghouse-Ohio University evaluation report was submitted on time
within a year of the contract award. And it was utilized-both in an
enlightenment or conceptual way, but also in an instrumental way.
Head Start was labeled a failure and became grist for the intellectual
mills viewing early educational interventions as based on improper
theory. Such thinkers as Hernnstein, Jencks, and Moynihan were in the
forefront of this effort. In commenting on the impact of the report,
Datta (1976) stated:
Few articles on early childhood education written for social policy fail to
mention the report as reasonably conclusive evidence that, if long-term
effects on school achievement are the goal, Head Start alone-is not the way to
achieve it [p. 161].
The program itself also suffered directly. The summer programs were
terminated, and funds for the year-long programs were frozen at a
constant level.
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What does this have to do with the inadequacies of timeliness? As
many of you know, the Westinghouse-Ohio report was incorrect. While
it was considered a &dquo;long-term&dquo; evaluation because it collected data
from students in grades I through 3 who had previously been in Head
Start, it did not assess important long-term effects. According to Datta,
it was only through the personal efforts of then HEW secretary Elliot
Richardson that the program survived at all. Nevertheless, I was
somewhat surprised when I encountered a researcher a few years ago
who claimed that he personally had saved Head Start. Despite being
taken aback at his immodest introduction, I did subsequently read a
copy of his evaluation study (Lazar et al., 1977).
The evaluation collected uniform follow-up data from 14 &dquo;experi-
mental infant and preschool programs&dquo; that used Head Start or Head
Start-like curricula. With but one exception, all the programs had been
conducted prior to the late 1960s. The follow-up data collected in 1977
thus provided a real long-term assessment of high-quality early
education interventions of the Head Start variety. The results, in
contrast to the Westinghouse evaluation, found &dquo;a significant increase
in IQ when compared to a control group that lasted for as long as three
years.&dquo; However, the follow-up data indicated that the IQ difference was
not maintained. The most startling results from the study were that early
education results in a significant reduction in the number of children
needing to be either held back a grade or placed in special education
classes. The authors of this study concluded that &dquo;the findings of this
report now leave no reasonable doubt that in the main, programs which
had deliberate cognitive curricula had a significant long-term effect on
school performance.&dquo; .
The findings of this report make one wonder-and made me
wonder-abaut the logic of the policymaker-utilization-timeliness
linkage. Riecken, Boruch, and associates (1974) had said that &dquo;evaluation
is a political act,&dquo; and Cronbach, in his adddress and subsequent book
Toward Reform of Program Evaluation (Cronbach et al., 1980), had
amplified and extended this theme. In essence, it is a so-called policy-
shaving community that drives the evaluation enterprise, according to
Cronbach. Chelimsky, in her ERS presidential address, discussed a new
process &dquo;which begins with the user and moves to an evaluation.&dquo; But all
of this smacks of the tail wagging the dog. Policymakers come and go,
but the same old social problems remain. The current debate over the
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quality of education and students’ ability to function in an increasingly
technological age is a reprise of the post-Sputnik angst that shook the
educational system in the late 1950s and early 1960s and resulted, in
part, in programs such as Head Start.
I know, all too well, the problems in generalizing from a single case. I
had a similar &dquo;Aha!&dquo; experience in another report that I was inadver-
tently forced to read. My colleague, Lee Sechrest, had on numerous
occasions spoken enthusiastically about the work of Roland Tharp and
Ronald Gallimore and their general approach to evaluation described in
their chapter in the 1979 Evaluation Studies Review Annual (Tharp &
Gallimore, 1979). As with most busy academic evaluators, the paper
soon was buried in my &dquo;must read when I have some time&dquo; pile. As fate
would have it, I one day assigned the preceding chapter in the ESRA
volume to my class and the secretary mistakenly photocopied and
attached the Tharp and Gallimore chapter as well. Remembering the
sage advice of my former colleague at Northwestern, Bob Boruch-
&dquo;Waste not, want not&dquo;-and considering the substantial copying
charges, I immediately assigned Tharp and Gallimore as well.
They describe an ecological approach to evaluation called the
&dquo;climax&dquo; model that entails a lengthy period of research and develop-
ment until the final stable program is attained. In all honesty, I cannot
say that I was immediately enlightened by the chapter. In fact, I found it
somewhat anticlimactic. (Well, last year we had subpoena envy.) My
initial cynical response was that such an evaluation was nice work if you
could get it, and that it provided full employment for evaluators. How-
ever, I was skeptical that an outcome evaluation would ever occur given
the changing nature of innovations and that none was presented by the
authors even after a number of years of evaluative work. But with time
my attitude changed. As I began to study innovations in medicine, I saw
quite clearly that even surgical and drug technologies change with time
and that an early evaluation can be premature. I was all the more
convinced when I saw that most major medical evaluations take five
years or more. The recently completed medical social experiment ex-
amining primarily behavioral factors in reducing heart disease, called the
Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial or MRFIT (1982) took ten
years to conduct at a cost of $115 million (Kolata, 1982).
. 
What does all this mean? I want to make it perfectly clear: I am not
advocating that you withhold your final reports. However, I do find
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fault with the current accepted logic that determines when a final report
is due. Certainly a medical researcher would laugh at any policymaker
who demanded an early report or preliminary findings. And most
policymakers would not dare to ask. But there are numerous cases of
this going back to the evaluation of Head Start. So why does this
problem exist in education but not in medicine? And how does one
determine the proper length of an educational evaluation study?
As to the first question, two related issues-equity and importance-
seem to account for some of the difference in temporal approaches. III
health, unlike poor education, seems to know no class ors’ocioeconomic
boundaries. While the more affluent can afford good education, they
cannot easily buy their way out of cancer, heart disease, and other major
illness. As a consequence, health may be seen as more important to more
people. For drug and some medical devices true experiments or random-
ized clinical trials (RCTs for short) are mandated by law to determine
their effectiveness and safety before they can be marketed. No such
similar policy is deemed necessary in educational innovation. Again,
this is perhaps an indication of the relative differential importance
accorded the two areas. Certainly the status our society accords physi-
cians and teachers would support that, as would the social expenditures
for the two areas. Policymakers may feel comfortable in dictating to
educators, given that it is largely a governmental activity from funding
to actual delivery, but they do not, nor have they been very successful in
controlling the medical care system.
The second question concerning the length of an evaluative study is a
bit more problematic. It is perhaps simple and convenient to say the
evaluation should be as long as the policymaker wants. But that ignores
the internal dynamics and theoretical rationale for an intervention. Not
only do programs take considerable time to develop, as Tharp and BGallimore note, but the program’s effects may be small, incremental , 1
and, with luck, cumulative. This is not a new point-John Heilman said ..
as much in 1980. As Heilman (1980) noted, such &dquo;programs are likely to
have measurable effects only over a period of months or years.&dquo; This is
the general case in medicine and, I believe, in education as well. In a
paper Bob Boruch and I wrote a few years ago (Boruch & Wortman, ; [
1979), we observed that program developers too often either looked for /
large effects or promised them to funders and policymakers to obtain I
needed support. This raised expectations too high and set evaluations to 
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detect large, immediate effects. Under such circumstances just about
any methodological approach would work. Mosteller (1981) and his
associates (Gilbert et al., 1977) have shown, however, that the vast
majority of innovations fail. Those that work often have small effects
that are hard to detect without good methods such as RCTs with
sufficient statistical power. For example, Bill Yeaton and I have been
examining the research literature on coronary artery bypass graft
surgery-the so-called CABG procedure. We found an average surgical
benefit of only 4% greater survival than medically treated patients
(Wortman & Yeaton, 1983). A study would require over 1100 patients to
detect this effect reliably, and none of the 9 RCTs conducted included
this many patients.
Well, I have been trying to answer the question indirectly. To be more
specific, some time for program development and implementation must
be allocated. This formative process usually takes a few years. Second,
some realistic estimate of the expected effect must be made. From this
the length of the evaluative study can be derived. Thus the utilization-
driven timeliness approach must be reversed.
It would seem reasonable for evaluations to seek long-term effects
allowing for some program development and the cumulative impact of
incremental small effects. Perhaps evaluation should be &dquo;given away&dquo; as
a former head of the American Psychological Association recom-
mended for applied psychological research in his presidential address.
At the very least, evaluators could leave easily maintained data archives
that could be reviewed at appropriate intervals. I fully recognize that
things can get out of hand and that evaluation reports may never get
written. Clearly, there are limits. As John Maynard Keynes said, &dquo;In the
long run we’re all dead.&dquo; Cronbach (1975) has worried about hidden
temporal interactions that may change any relationship in the long run.
We obviously have to be judicious with our scarce evaluative resources,
and there is no guarantee that the results will differ from those found in
the short run, as the recent follow-up report on psychotherapy found
(Nicholson & Berman, 1983). But I believe inexpensive archiving may be
one way to accomplish this. Thus we probably need an additional
commandment: To paraphrase Paul Masson, we shall conduct no
evaluation before its time.
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METHOD
The timing of an evaluation has, I believe, direct implications for the
methods employed. In this I am also in agreement with Heilman (1980)
and Tharp and Gallimore (1979). It is time to end, once and for all, our
methodological bickering and paradigmatic power struggles. There is a
time and place for all methods. Depending on the circumstances, one or
another may be the most suitable, and often multiple methods will be
useful.
The early developmental stages of a program are best suited to the /richly textured qualitative methods advocated by many (see Patton,
1978; House, 1980), as are unique situations often occurring in complex
organizations. I recently completed a go~rernment contract to evaluate
the National Institutes of Health Consensus Development Program
(Wortman et al., 1982)-a unique approach to medical technology
assessment using an evaluative concept similar to the &dquo;science court&dquo;
(Kantrowitz et al., 1976). The program was one of a kind and just
beginning its third year when the evaluation study began. This clearly
was not the time or the place for a randomized experiment. Instead, we
spent a lot of time observing the process, interviewing various partici-
pants, and reading archival material. That does not mean that other
methods were inappropriate, only that it took considerable time to
develop a conceptual framework that made such activity meaningful.
We did do a considerable amount of &dquo;number crunching&dquo; as well. We
designed a survey instrument for conference participants; we performed
a kind of content analysis on the consensus statements-the jury ver-
dicts on the effectiveness, safety, and appropriate conditions for using
the technology; and we did a small-scale randomized experiment com-
paring high-quality news reports to the consensus statements.
I mention this experience because as President of ERS I am repre-
senting an organization that has what Don Campbell would call a &dquo;hard
science&dquo; image. Moreover, as a former Northwestern evaluator, I per-
sonally am associated with such methodological proclivities. Speaking
for both, there is room and a clear need for methodological ecumeni-
cism.
Incidentally, if I may return to the NIH evaluation for a moment, it is
interesting to contrast the ease of conducting more formal evaluative
studies to those in other areas of health. The Office of Management and
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Budget guidelines prohibit formal experiments containing more than
nine experimental subjects unless prior clearance is obtained. Since the
clearance process takes at least nine months, it effectively eliminates
methods in such short-term, timely evaluation. So our study of the
utility of the consensus statements was limited to 18 physicians-nine
were randomly assigned to read a consensus statement and nine read a
report from a journal like Science. As I have already noted, such
randomized studies are routinely required for drugs. In fact, NIH
spends well over $100 million annually on RCTs such as MRFIT. In
health it is not unusual to find various statutory requirements waived to
allow such studies.
In education this does not appear to be common practice. Boruch,
Cordray, and associates (1983) made just such a recommendation in
their recent report to the Holtzman committee on federal education
evaluation practice. This is a reasonable and sensible suggestion. In
health it is also not uncommon to find a number of hospitals combining
to conduct a single study. Such so-called multicenter clinical trials
provide the large number of subjects needed to test an innovative
program or technology in a short period. This avoids the temporal
interactions feared by Cronbach and the technological change feared by
medical researchers. For example, the MRFIT study involved 12,866
men recruited at 22 different clinical centers over a two-year period.
In contrast, the follow-up study of Head Start-like experimental
programs was a retrospective, patched-up multicenter evaluation.
While participants did agree on a common posttest protocol, there was
no common pretest protocol, uniform eligibility requirements, or ran-
dom assignment. In fact, the researchers had difficulty obtaining fund-
ing given the preconceptions derived from the Westinghouse-Ohio
evaluation. As far as I know, there have been no randomized multicenter
educational evaluations.
Randomized studies are the Cadillacs of research methods, and they
carry a price tag that may not sell in today’s economic market. Other
methods that have recently become fashionable are quite cost-effective
and have achieved some interest in the governmental-evaluation sector.
I am speaking of research synthesis methods such as Glass’s meta-
analysis. Chelimsky, in her presidential address, described the General
Accounting Offices’s plans to employ &dquo;evaluation synthesis&dquo; as a timely,
policy-relevant, inexpensive method. Since then GAO has conducted a
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number of these syntheses-all of which have been qualitative, by the
way. My colleagues Fred Bryant, Bill Yeaton, and I have been conduct-
ing quantitative syntheses in education and health.
In education, Bryant and I have been examining the literature on
school desegregation and academic achievement (Wortman & Bryant,
in press). Despite the policy relevance and social resources and conflict
engendered by this issue, it is a most desultory literature. We were able
to locate over 100 studies, of which only 19 were usable for such a
synthesis. There were no usable randomized studies and most were weak
quasi-experiments. Surprisingly, only two of the usable studies had been
published. Most were unpublished hard-to-locate dissertations-a
truly, and perhaps properly, fugitive literature.
By contrast, Yeaton and I uncovered 25 high-quality studies out of
the 90 we found on the CABGS procedure (Wortman & Yeaton, 1983).
Nine were RCTs and the remainder were strong quasi-experiments. All
were published in good medical journals. Again, this points up the
variation in methodological quality by area. The irony is that an impov-
erished area such as educational evaluation produces studies of such
poor quality as to make cost-effective procedures such as research
synthesis of questionable value.
Again, it is interesting to speculate on the reasons for the difference in
methodological orientation toward evaluation in the two areas. The
same factors noted earlier seem to be important. In addition, the life-
threatening aspects of more concrete, tangible health interventions
appear to play a role. After all, it was the thalidomide scare in the early
1960s that led to the requirement for &dquo;adequate and well-controlled
investigation.&dquo; These have been interpreted to be two well-done RCTs.
While ease of conducting such evaluative studies may partly explain the
difference, other factors seem to be at work as well. Those noted earlier
seem important. In addition, NIH has funded numerous complex,
expensive RCTs. NIH has escaped much of the political turmoil that has
characterized education, perhaps due to its reputation as a hard science,
research organization. The National Institute of Education never had
the funding or the staff leadership to accomplish this. Only last week I
learned that NIE would not publish a report of a consensus-like confer-
ence examining the desegregation issue even though the panel was
stacked to find with no effects or harmful effects of desegregation. Of
course, it did not, and the political hacks running NIE have jettisoned
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the report and fired the project officer. While NIH is by no means free of
petty bureaucrats and politics, there is more scientific freedom to be
controversial.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The question I posed at the onset concerned the future of evaluation
research. What, then, are the implications of my intervening comments
for the profession?
On the temporal aspects of evaluation, there are at least two points to
be drawn. First, the evaluator and program designer have to play a more
central role in educating the funder, and others in the &dquo;policy shaping
community,&dquo; on the proper design of an evaluative study. In health a
biostatistician is typically given a central role and carries out this
function.
Second, the utilization-driven approach is largely a government eval-
uative contract activity. However, the portfolio of evaluative activities
must now be expanded beyond the federal government. The theme of
this meeting is to explore not only ways to make this relationship work
better but, more important, to explore other areas requiring evaluative
skills. Private business is one major area, especially in the areas of
market research. Here many of the issues and methods of-evaluation,
including timeliness, will be similar. However, the problems may be
more diverse, the bureaucracy less rigid, and the rewards more enrich-
ing. Health is another area, and one that has been used throughout this
address to illustrate the potential for evaluation.in other areas. This
does not mean that health is an evaluator’s Nirvana. As Tom Chalmers
has written, there is great room for improvement. However, the founda-
tions are there for significant evaluative work without the hassles noted
earlier. In either case though, the evaluator-you and I-must play a
more active educative role.
I Concerning the methodological issues, there are also a number ofpoints. Multiple methods are appropriate to the proper conduct of
evaluations, even within a single study. Evaluators have to recognize
that their specific skills may be inadequate for a particular study. This
can be handled by learning new methods-the function of the preses-
sions held here yesterday-or bringing together a team of people with
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the requisite skills. There are, as the current program and recent texts
indicate, many relevant new skills to be mastered: Cost-benefit analysis,
structural equation models, survey methods, and quality-of-life mea-
sures are among the many new and emerging skills needed.
There are, in addition, different methods that may be most appropriate
at different times, as noted earlier. Thus the evaluator may have to apply
the temporal perspective and constraints to the methods available. A
quick-and-dirty RCT or outcome evaluation, such as the Westinghouse
study, is no longer &dquo;kosher&dquo; by today’s standards. Evaluators must
temper their need for economic survival with methodological honesty.
In sum, we must believe that there is a fruitful future for evaluation.
As long as society has the resources and the will to cope with
evolutionary challenges through active interventions, there will be a
need for well-thought-out and well-conducted evaluative studies.
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Those ERN/ENet members who remained for Saturday morning’s
featured speaker were richly rewarded by Dr. Thomas C. Chalmers’s
